Abstract: This paper very briefly considers three ways of expanding the study of Roman income levels beyond the limits of empirical data on costs and wages, by considering the determinants of real incomes, the use of proxy data for real incomes, and the potential of cross-cultural comparison.
depends on specific assumptions, most notably about underlying trends in population size, and that significantly different assumptions would occasion substantial revisions. Even so, in as much as modern observers will find it less taxing or hopeless to reconstruct general contextual conditions (such as the ones listed in Table 2 ) than to measure wages and costs per se, this approach, however conjectural, opens up a new avenue in the study of economic development that allows us to overcome impasse created by the pervasive scarcity of income data.
Proxy data for real incomes
Information on the cost of unfree labor may also shed some light on real incomes in the economy as a whole. Thus, we might conjecture that high slave prices are indicative of high wages overall, or vice versa. Willem Jongman advances this argument in his chapter on consumption in the early Roman empire for the forthcoming Cambridge economic history of the Greco-Roman world, arguing that the substantial manumission premiums recorded at Delphi point to fairly high nominal as well as real wages for non-slave workers. 5 We must bear in mind that much of this argument hinges on the representative nature of these freed slaves: if they were atypical -i.e., more highly skilled or otherwise more privileged than the average slave -, their fees need not tell us a great deal about basic income levels. Moreover, my own survey of slave prices and free wages reveals further complications: broadly speaking, it appears that slaves in classical Athens were rather cheap (relative to wage levels), whereas in Roman Egypt (and probably in other parts of the empire as well) they were relatively more expensive (Table 3) . 6 This suggests that the relationship between slave prices and wages was more complex and mediated by secondary factors such as turnover risk, i.e. the stability of labor markets.
7 Nonetheless, at least in principle, this indirect approach once again permits us to extend our studies beyond the narrow confines of existing data sets on wages.
Comparative evidence
In his paper, Rathbone raises the question of how the salaries of Roman government officials compared to those of Han China. A simple comparison shows dramatically higher levels of income as well as inequality among Roman imperial functionaries (Table  4 ). In the first century CE, the top Han officials -the 'Three Excellencies' and the Regent -received some 63 tonnes of wheat equivalent per annum, or perhaps closer to 100 tonnes including the emperor's annual gifts. This compensation amounts to maybe 5 per cent of the annual pay of top proconsuls in the Principate or the praetorian prefects in late antiquity. The next-most-senior Han functionaries -the 'Nine Ministers', functionally equivalent to the top procurators of the mature Principate -received 32 or perhaps rather 50 tonnes of wheat equivalent, about a tenth of the annual income of their Roman counterparts. The Han equivalent of a Roman provincial governor was paid some 22 tonnes, around one-fifth of the income of the most junior Roman procurators, and similar to the base pay of a mere Roman centurion: this is remarkable given that the average Han governor was in charge of half a million people while a centurion commanded only 80 soldiers. Han officials in charge of civitas-sized districts received significantly less than a Roman centurion.
Not only were real salaries much higher in Rome, but wage compression was much more pronounced in China: the income ratio between a Chinese district administrator and the most senior state official was only 1 to 6 or 8, compared to a ratio of 1 to 17 or 18 between a junior procurator and a top senator or between a provincial military commander and a praetorian prefect. We may conjecture that the much greater degree of stratification in Rome may have been a legacy of its oligarchic tradition that channelled benefits to its ruling class. This comparison furthermore suggests that owing to these income differences, the numerically more limited bureaucracy of the Later Roman Empire (of some 30,000 officials) need not have been less expensive overall than the much more numerous Han bureaucracy.
8 This, in turn, raises the possibility that at least in terms of cost, the mature Roman empire cannot necessarily be regarded as less bureaucratized than the Han state. This last example takes us beyond the issue of wages and costs in the Roman empire but shows how direct and indirect evidence for income levels can be used to generate new insights outside economic history as well. (Cambridge, 1980) 
